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Executive summary
Overview
Current policy in the English National Health Service (NHS) promotes concentration of the
specialised treatment of relatively rare and complex conditions into a limited number of specialist
centres. However if a more complex patient case-mix leads to specialised treatments being
systematically more costly than non-specialised treatment, then the national tariff payment system
based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) may punitively penalise centres that perform this
activity.
Data and methods
We apply the Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) definitions of specialised care, both for the
original 13/14 tool and the 14/15 shadow monitoring tool (PSS-SMT), to patient-level data from the
Hospital Episode Statistics mapped to reference cost data for three financial years, from 2011/12 to
2013/14. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) and random effects (RE) models to ascertain the cost
differential associated with receipt of specialised care for patients allocated to the same HRG.
We analyse costs for each individual patient to determine whether the receipt of specialised care is
associated with higher costs relative to patients allocated to the same HRG who did not receive
specialised care.
We specify six analytical models:
x Model 1: cost analysis of the full sample, with the dependent variable defined as the full set
of costs, including excess bed day and unbundled costs.
x Model 2: cost analysis of a reduced sample, where patients allocated to fully specialised and
fully non-specialised HRGs are dropped, as their costs are reflected in the base tariffs.
x Model 3: core HRG cost analysis of the reduced sample, with the dependent variable
capturing only the core HRG cost, not excess bed day and unbundled costs, as these are
reimbursed separately.
x Model 4: as model 3, but with PSS eligibility criteria also used to identify whether a patient
has received specialised care.
x Model 5: Excess bed day cost model: analysis of variation in excess bed costs, only for those
patients that stay beyond their HRG trimpoint.
x Model 6: analysis of LoS of the full sample, as a sensitivity analysis given concerns about
Reference Cost not being truly patient-level costs.
We calculate the total additional costs associated with each specialised service at national level and
examine the extent to which specialised services are concentrated within or spread across hospitals
and HRGs.
Results
Out of 16,964,893 patients treated in English hospitals in 2013/14, 10.5% were identified as having
received specialised care under PSS rules and 11.8% under PSS-SMT rules. Estimated cost
differentials are generally stable over years and across different models. For 2013/14 data:
x For 29 of the 69 PSS markers, we find cost differentials in excess of 10% when analysing the
cost of the core HRG to which patients are allocated (Model 3 RE).
x Only 24 of these 29 PSS markers have cost differentials in excess of 10% when the updated
PSS-SMT rules are applied.
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x We find that 6 of the 35 new PSS-SMT markers have cost differentials in excess of 10%.
x We observe fewer cost differentials when considering excess bed day costs (Model 5 RE),
the differential being in excess of 10% for only 9 PSS markers.
The additional costs associated with the provision of specialised care to the entire patient
population are estimated to amount to £572m in 2011/12, £628m in 2012/13 and £589m in
2013/14.
Conclusions
For those markers for which the estimated cost differential is deemed to have a material impact, we
suggest two ways in which payment policy might be refined.
First, in cases where patients are distributed across many HRGs, top-up payments might be made to
reflect the additional costs associated with receipt of specialised care. We identify 20 of the original
PSS markers as candidates for top-ups, including several cardiac and childrens services. The
following new PSS-SMT markers implemented in the PSS Shadow Monitoring Tool are also
candidates for top-up arrangements: Sarcoma, Head and Neck cancer  Sarcoma; Upper GI Surgery;
Specialised Urology - Penile cancer; Specialised Urology - Testicular cancer; Spinal cord injury; and
Paediatric Surgery - Trauma and Orthopaedics.
Second, HRGs might be re-defined, so that they better separate higher cost patients that receive
specialised care from those that do not. PSS markers identified as candidates for HRG split include
Radiotherapy, Cardiac - PPCI and Structural Heart Disease Ears - Cochlear Implants; and Colorectal -
Transanal Endoscopic Microsurgery. The four PSS markers that might subject to a sub-division of
their HRGs are recommended for top-up payments in the interim before this sub-division is
implemented.
For some specialised services there is a case for re-visiting the identification rules, notably
Neurosciences  Neurosurgery.
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1. Introduction
There is evidence that outcomes following treatment are superior in places that perform more of
the treatment in question (Bachmann et al., 2003, Hillner et al., 2000, Skipworth et al., 2010, Smith,
2002). Although a general causal link between the volume of activity and outcomes has not been
established definitively (Harrison, 2012), in England there is a move toward concentrating the
provision of some types of service in specialist centres rather than having them delivered in general
hospitals (NHS England, 2014a). For instance, from 2011 onwards stroke patients in London have
been admitted into one out of 8 hyperacute stroke units, providing more specialised care to stroke
patients, which led to improved overall outcomes (Morris et al., 2014). Concentration is particularly
important for specialised services, which invariably, and often by definition, are provided to people
with relatively rare conditions. Delivery of such services requires a skilled team of staff and
concentrating services in dedicated units is deemed the only way to ensure that volumes are
sufficient to ensure best possible outcomes (NHS Specialised Services, 2010).
Concentration of services in this way means that specialised providers will treat patients that differ
systematically from those treated in general hospitals, differences that may impact on the cost of
treatment. If the reimbursement system does not account for such differences, hospitals that treat
more costly patients will be financially disadvantaged, at the risk of undermining the policy toward
greater concentration. In many countries, hospitals are reimbursed according to the amount and
type of activity that they perform, with the type of activity described using some form of Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs) (Busse et al., 2013), the English version being known as Healthcare Resource
'ƌŽƵƉƐ ?,Z'Ɛ ? ?'ƌĂƓŝēĞƚĂůĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞŚŽǁ,Z'ƐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ?'ƌĂƓŝēĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
HRGs are intended to be both clinically meaningful and resource homogenous. Resource
homogeneity implies that all patients allocated to the same HRG have the same expected resource
requirement, with any variation in actual costs from the expected level being entirely random. This
provides the rationale for reimbursing hospitals using HRGs (O'Reilly et al., 2012) under a
prospective payment system, formerly termed Payment by Results (PbR) but now called the National
Tariff Payment System. The tariffs reflect average costs, reported by all hospitals as part of the
annual Reference Cost (RC) data collection.
This payment arrangement works well if variation in costs within HRGs is, indeed, entirely random
across patients and hospitals. But if there is systematic variation in costs associated with particular
groups of patients, problems arise: the payment system may either deter hospitals from treating
these patients or punitively penalize hospitals that do so. The policy of concentrating specialised
services in particular providers may give rise to or accentuate such problems.
To overcome these problems, it is necessary to ascertain by how much costs are higher for patients
that receive specialised care than for other patients allocated to the same HRG. This requires
defining what is meant by specialised care and a means of determining whether individual patients
have received such care. Having done this, it is then possible to compare the costs of hospital
treatment of those in the same HRG payment category who received specialised care with those
that did not. If there is evidence of a cost differential, there is a case for refining the payment
system in some way so that these differences do not impact negatively on the care that patients
receive or the payments made to hospitals that provide specialised services.
There are two broad policy options. The first, and easiest to implement, is to introduce a top-up
payment that it is paid to a hospital for each of its patients that has received the particular type of
specialised care. The size of these top-up payments would reflect the estimated cost differential.
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The second option, which would take longer to implement, is to refine the underlying HRGs to which
patients are allocated. This option is most appropriate when patients that receive the particular
type of specialised care in question are concentrated in a small number of HRGs. To assess this, we
calculate concentration ratios to show the concentration of specialised activity among HRGs
(Siegfried, 1975).
In England it is possible to identify whether a patient received specialised care and, if so, what type
of care was received. In section 2 we describe identification rules known as Prescribed Specialised
Services (PSS). We apply these rules to patient-level data for each of the financial years 2011/12,
2012/13 and 2013/14, allowing us to identify the type of specialised care provided to each patient, if
any. We then analyse cost differentials associated with receipt of specialised care, using patient-
level data described in section 3. In section 4 we outline our empirical strategy to investigate the
extent to which variations in the cost of hospital treatment are explained by whether or not a
patient received a specialised service and for our analyses of the concentrations of specialized care
among hospitals and HRGs. Section 5 focuses on the results, derived from six analytical models.
Section 6 considers the overall financial impact of paying for Prescribed Specialised Services, the
concentration of specialised activity among hospitals and HRGs, and how payment arrangements
might be refined for specific PSS markers. The policy implications of the results are discussed,
limitations acknowledged and conclusions drawn in section 6.
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2. Data
In order to assess the costs associated with hospitalized patients receiving specialised services, we
analyse data from the patient level Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) matched to Reference Cost (RC)
data reported by all English hospitals for each of the three financial years 2011/12, 2012/13 and
2103/14. The HES contains details about every patient treated in the English National Health Service
(NHS) during the financial year. There are various issues regarding the data that need to be
addressed:
x Cleaning the HES data.
x How to determine whether or not a patient received specialised care.
x How to assign costs to each patient record, defined as a Finished Consultant Episode
(FCE) in the Hospital Episode Statistics.
x How to determine the cost of a provider spell for those patients who have multiple FCEs.
2.1 Cleaning the HES data
Each observation in HES comprises a Finished Consultant Episode (FCE), measuring the time the
patient spends under the care of a particular consultant. From the initial sample of HES records, our
analytical sample is reduced to episodes after cleaning.
x Patients with duration errors (with missing or implausible start and end dates) are
dropped.
x Duplicate records are removed.
x We consider only those patients treated in NHS acute hospitals. Hence, patients treated
in mental health, ambulance and primary care trusts (with the exception of the Isle of
Wight) are excluded.
Details of the number of observations before and after cleaning are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Raw and cleaned from Hospital Episodes Statistics
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
FCEs FCEs FCEs
Raw HES 18,889,329 19,112,187 19,578,568
Duration errors,
duplicates and
coding problems
134,948 55,139 30,230
Cleaned HES 18,754,381 19,057,048 19,548,338
2.2 Identifying whether a patient received specialised care
In England, specialised services are generally defined as:
those services provided in relatively few hospitals, to catchment populations of more than one
million people. The number of patients accessing these services is small, and a critical mass of
patients is needed in each treatment centre in order to achieve the best outcomes and
maintain the clinical competence of NHS staff. These services tend to be located in specialist
hospital Trusts in major towns and cities. Concentrating services in this way ensures that
specialist staff can be more easily recruited and their training maintained. It is also more cost-
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effective and makes the best use of resources such as high tech equipment and staff expertise
(NHS England, 2014b).
This general definition is now operationalised through the set of identification rules known as the
PSS, which replaced the Specialised Services National Definition Sets (SSNDS) which we have
described elsewhere (Bojke et al., 2014). The replacement was driven by changes in commissioning
responsibilities brought about by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 which meant that some
specialised services would be commissioned nationally, and others locally. The Act transferred
responsibility for commissioning specialised services from Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to the newly
established NHS Commissioning Board, since renamed NHS England. As part of the transfer of
responsibility, the opportunity was taken to review the rules used to determine what constituted
specialised care, leading to the new set of identification rules being drawn up by which to determine
what should constitute Prescribed Specialised Services (NHS England, 2014b).
In addition to the above general definition of specialised services, four additional factors were
explicitly set out for determining whether services should be directly commissioned by NHS England
instead of by the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) that replaced PCTs as commissioners of
health services for geographically defined populations:
1. The number of individuals who require the service or facility.
2. The cost of providing the service or facility.
3. The number of organisations able to provide the service or facility.
4. The financial implications for CCGs if they were required to arrange for the provision of
the service or facility.
These changes were argued to result in a much clearer description of the services which would be
appropriate  to commission (NHS Information Centre for health and social care, 2010). The PSS
manual and accompanying spreadsheet published in 2014 set out identification rules for 143 groups
of specialised services, of which 69 relate to services for patients admitted to hospital (NHS England,
2014b). There were a further 20 services identified, but not included in the PSS identification toolkit
(e.g. Tier 4 CAMHS Inpatients). The Prescribed Specialised Services 2013-14 Identification Tool is
available onlinea. The rules and ICD10 and OPCS codes are described in a spreadsheet that is also
publicly availableb.
In May 2015 the National Casemix Office (NCO) published an update to the Prescribed Specialised
Services Identification tool  the 2015/16 Shadow Monitoring tool (PSS-SMT). The PSS-SMT is
intended for commissioning use in 2016/17.
The PSS-SMT represents a fairly substantial revision of the original PSS identification rules, there
being two main types of revision:
(i) changes to the codes used to identify whether a patient has received specialised care
and
(ii) changes to the eligibility criteria used to determine whether a hospital should be
providing a particular type of specialised care.
Specialised services are labelled as a combination of one of the six National Programmes of Care
(NPoC) clinical reference groups (CRG) and a unique code/flag with an associated descriptive
a
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/casemix/prescribedspecialisedservices
b
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/11878/PS-201314-Identification-Code-
Sets/xls/PS_2013_14_Prescribed_Services_Identification_Code_Sets_v1.1.xlsx.
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Prescribed Service Line text. Each NPoC CRG features a three digit code followed by a general
description e.g. D06  Burns. The first letter indicates which of the six functional categories the CRG
belongs to, in this example D refers to trauma. There are 75 CRGs in total, not all of which are
represented in the PSS or SMT-PSS. Full details of the NPoC CRGs are available at
http://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/spec-services/npc-crg/
Individual specialised services sit within a 2-level hierarchy with all services nested in one of the
NPoC CRGs. Thus a CRG does not necessarily identify a specific specialised service, but any
specialised service can only belong to one NPoC CRG. However, the Prescribed Service Line (PSL)
text and associated code/flag does uniquely identify a specialised service. The code/flag is an 8 digit
alphanumeric text string which begins with NCBPS, with the remaining 3 digits uniquely identifying
a service. For example the following code/flags and PSL text all belong to the D09  Ear Surgery
NPoC CRG: NCBPS32A Ears- Cochlear implants; NCBPS32B Ears  Bone anchored hearing aids and
NCBPS32D Ears  Middle ear implants.
The exception to the above coding classification is the Highly Specialised service (NCBPS99Z) which
has its own eponymous NPoC category that is not part of the standard six NPoC categories.
The PSS-SMT changes can be summarised as follows:
1. 31 PSS markers are unchanged, the original PSS identification rules remaining the same
under PSS-SMT.
2. Three PSS markers have been dropped completely under PSS-SMT, namely 04C fetal
medicine, 04E specialised maternity and 13K Cardiac Surgery  other.
3. 35 new PSS-SMT markers have been added, the following of which are of note:
a. 4 belonged to the set of 20 admitted patient care services that were identified but
not implemented in the original PSS (e.g. Tier 4 CAMHS Inpatients).
b. 14 of the new PSS-SMT markers are a refinement of cancer services, most of
which involve further disaggregation of the original PSS 01Y rare cancer definition.
c. Specialised dermatology is now included with 4 new service lines.
d. Mental health categories are expanded from 1 service line to 6.
4. The identification rules for 35 PSS markers have been revised
a. The most extensive changes are to PSS marker 01T Teenage and Young cancer,
with an additional 325 diagnosis codes originally omitted from the rules and the
identification of 108 eligible providers.
b. At the other extreme, the PSS-SMT adds just 1 additional procedure code for 13F
PPCI and Structural Heart Disease.
We have applied the identification rules embodied in the PSS 2013-14 Identification Tool to the HES
data for each of the financial years and the PSS-SMT to 2013/14 data. This allows us to identify the
specific type of specialised care, if any, received by each patient in the data.
2.3 Mapping of reference costs to HES records
We match each patients HES record to the RC reported by their hospital in order to establish the
cost of the core HRG to which they are allocated. Matching is done through a combination of
hospital code, point of delivery (PoD) (e.g. day case, elective, non-elective), specialty (e.g. 300:
General Surgery) and HRG code (e.g. EB07H: Arrhythmia or Conduction Disorders, with CC).
All Reference Costs are adjusted by the market forces factor (MFF), this being an index of
geographical variation in the prices of land, buildings, and labour, designed to account for
unavoidable differences in factor prices incurred by different hospitals.
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Some HES records are dropped from the analysis because RC information is unavailable. These are:
(i) NHS patients treated at private providers because private providers do not report costs.
(ii) Patients without the requisite information or coding errors in their HES record to
determine HRG allocation. These are assigned to the undefined HRG code UZ01Z, and
for whom no payment is made.
(iii) Patients allocated to HRGs that have a zero cost attached to them, in accordance with
the Reference Cost requirements.c Hospitals are paid for these activities either via local
arrangements or through other HRGs (e.g. payment is made for the maternity care
provided to the mother (eg NZ11B) but there is no separate payment made for delivery
of a healthy baby (PB03Z)).
Details of the number of FCEs dropped for each of these reasons are shown in Table 2, together with
information about the proportion of these that are identified as having received specialised care.
Hospitals are paid extra for patients with length of stay beyond the HRG specific trimpoint; we add
the hospitals HRG-specific excess per diem cost for each additional day. For 4.1% of FCEs length of
stay exceeds their HRG trimpoint.
While all FCEs have a core HRG, around 1.9m FCEs have unbundled HRGs associated with them,
these being high cost services or procedures counted separately for reporting and payment
purposes. Unbundling helps to make HRGs 'setting independent' so that healthcare can be provided
and funded across a variety of settings.d For 73% of these 1.9m FCEs we can attach a cost to each
of the constituent unbundled HRGs. For the remainder, no additional costs are added to the core
HRG costs because no costs are reported for their unbundled activity.
Table 2 Summary of original and analytical samples
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
N Spells % PSS N Spells % PSS N Spells % PSS % PSS-
SMT
Cleaned HES 16,599,033 9.71 16,592,681 9.97 16,964,893 10.53 11.76
Private providers 346,362 1.15 357,164 1.12 360,712 1.14 1.11
UZ01Z 193,288 7.19 150,342 2.44 151,809 2.05 2.50
Zero Cost HRGs 2,069,316 32.92 2,023,553 37.78 1,635,554 50.53 78.61
Analytical sample 12,286,246 6.21 12,544,761 6.45 12,474,184 6.36 6.20
Those with
Excess Bed Days
724,771 11.73 654,916 9.07 625,769 10.62 9.68
Those with
Unbundled Costs
2,488,289 40.98 2,710,035 40.44 2,699,727 43.40 44.01
Note: patients that receive multiple types of specialised service are counted only once in the counts of FCEs
2.4 Assessing the cost of provider spells
To be able to determine the number of individuals that received specialised care we need to convert
the FCEs that comprise the unit of observation in the HES data into provider spells. Around 90% of
c
Zero cost HRGs include: DZ13* and PA13* - (both Cystic Fibrosis with the star indicating that there are HRG splits),LA08E
(dialysis), PB03Z (Healthy Baby), SB97Z (Same Day Chemotherapy), SC97Z (Radiotherapy).
d
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/hrg4/
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patients remain under the care of a single consultant during their entire hospital stay. The
remainder are cared for by more than one consultant, most usually because they are transferred
from one specialty to another. We track the consultant episodes pertaining to each individual
patient, allowing us to construct a provider spell for each patient, measuring the time from
admission to discharge.
Multi-episode spells are likely to be more costly than single-episode spells, but there is no agreed
method for determining the additional cost. In our previous work (ADD REF) we found that
estimation results were not sensitive to whether the cost of multi-episode spells was based on the
Sum, Maximum or First of the costs of the constituent FCEs. Consequently, in the analysis that
follows, the cost of a provider spell is calculated as the Sum of the cost of each FCE comprising the
patients spell in hospital.
The patients core HRG is defined as that which proves most costly among the alternatives to which
the patient is assigned across the constituent FCEs. After re-restructuring the HES data so that it
comprises observations defined as patient spells, we have an analytical sample of 12,286,246
observations, 6.21% of which received specialised care in 2011/12. In 2012/13 we have 12,544,761
spells, 6.45% of which are specialised and in 2013/14 we have 12,474,184 spells, 6.64% of which are
specialised with 6.35% specialised under the shadow tool specifications.
2.5 Changes to the HRG classification system
Our analyses are designed to assess whether patients who received specialised care have different
costs to other patients allocated to the same HRG. Observed cost differentials may vary from one
year to the next, partly because over the three years there have also been changes to the HRG
classification system used to describe and pay for patients admitted to hospital.
The HRG system is subject to continual development to accommodate changes in clinical practice
ĂŶĚƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ  ?'ƌĂƓŝēĞƚĂů ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞ,Z'ƐǇƐƚĞŵƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ
2011/12, HRG4, comprised approximately 1600 different HRG groups in 21 chapters. In 2012/13
HRG4 was replaced by a new system, HRG4+, developed to better differentiate high cost patients.
HRG4+ is radically different to HRG4, expanding the number of groups by approximately 25% to
2100 HRGs, only around 600 of which are common to both HRG4 and HRG4+.
HRG4+ is argued to provide better recognition of the resources used in treating sicker patients,
those that undergo multiple complex procedures and a more sophisticated treatment of age
(Monteith, 2013). The most significant change to the HRG structure was the level to which
complications and comorbidities (CC) were incorporated: HRG4 tended to adopt a binary approach
with a basic category with or without CC, whereas HRG4+ introduces a hierarchal system of graded
CCs and HRG categories determined on the underlying condition/procedure and the summed value
of the additional CCs. This allows for greater differentiation between patients with additional needs
and in some cases may explicitly capture those comorbidities which define a treatment as
specialised.
Figure 1 shows the number of HRGs according to the proportion of patients identified as having
received specialised care, as defined under the original PSS identification rules and also, for 2013/14,
by the PSS-SMT. There has been an increase in HRGs over time, from 1600 in 2011/12 to 2100 in
2013/14. Although the number of HRGs in which all patients received specialised care (100%) has
increased slightly over time, including a relatively large jump from 2011/12 (when HRG4 was last in
use), the vast majority of HRGs contain a mixture of patients who did and did not receive specialised
care.
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Figure 1 HRGs by the proportion of patients receiving specialised care
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3. Estimation models
3.1 Dependent variables
We construct four dependent variables for our analyses, all of which are specified as ratios. There
are two reasons for defining the dependent variable as a ratio:
1. We avoid having to include a set of more than 1600 (or 2100) dummy variables in the
regression equation to represent each HRG4 (or HRG4+). Including so many variables
would make estimation unwieldy, to say the least.
2. With some manipulation, we can calculate the percentage difference associated with
receipt of specialised care.
The first dependent variable is defined as the patients standardised cost ௜௞ ௜௛௞ ௛ where ௜௛௞
is the MFF-adjusted cost of patient i in HRG h in hospital k and ௛ is the national average cost of all
patients allocated to HRG4 h. The cost for each patient includes that of their core HRG and any
other to which they are assigned if they had multiple episodes, and includes unbundled costs and
excess bed day costs if their length of stay (LoS) exceeded the trimpoint of their core HRG.
The second dependent variable is of a similar form, except that it captures only the cost of the
patients core HRGs, notated as ௜௛௞כ , with the patients re-standardised cost now defined as௜௞כ ௜௛௞כ ௛כ .
The third dependent variable captures only the cost of excess bed days, such that ௜௛௞௘ , with the
patients re-standardised cost now defined as ௜௞௘ ௜௛௞௘ ௛௘.
The fourth dependent variable is constructed so as to analyse LoS rather than costs, with ௜௞௅௜௛௞ ௛ where ௜௛௞ is the length of stay of patient i in HRG h in hospital k and ௛ is the
national average length of stay of all patients allocated to the patients core HRG h.
3.2 Independent variables
If no account is taken of the possibility that costs may be partly related to the hospital in which care
is provided, the additional costs associated with receipt of specialised care are estimated by
regressing each patients standardised cost against the PSS definition sets (p=1P), which comprise
the 69 specialised care markers (R) indicating the type of specialised care received (if any). So, for
any individual i, ௣௜ if the patient received specialised care of type p, and 0 otherwise.
Estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the model takes the form:
௜ ௣ ௣௜ ௜௉௣ୀଵ (EQ1)
where are the parameters to be estimated: if positive and significant, a patient with the specialist
care marker has higher costs than do other patients allocated to the same HRG. ௜ captures random
error.
This model fails to recognise that costs may be driven partly by the hospital in which the patient is
treated. This can be examined by specifying a hierarchical model of the form:
௜௞ ௣ ௣௜௞ ௞ ௜௞௉௣ୀଵ (EQ2)
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This is a multi-level model that recognises that patients (i=1I) are clustered within hospitals
(k=1K). ௞ is the hospital random effect: patients treated in hospitals with higher effects have
higher costs than those treated elsewhere. ௜௞ captures random measurement error.
In order to derive the percentage difference in costs associated with receipt of specialised care, ௣,
we compute the marginal mean for both specialised and non-specialised services:
௣ ா൫௬೔หௌ೛ୀଵ,ࡿ൯ିா൫௬೔หௌ೛ୀ଴,ࡿ൯ா൫௬೔หௌ೛ୀ଴,ࡿ൯ (EQ3)
In May 2015, PSS-SMT was released, refining and expanding the original set of PSS markers.
Denoting the set of PSS-SMT markers as R, these can be substituted for R in equations EQ1 and EQ2
when analysing the 2013/14 data.
3.3 Choice between OLS and RE models
Over and above the costs associated with receipt of specialised care, patients treated in the same
hospital are likely to have similar costs to one another. This is because there will be hospital-specific
factors that drive costs for all patients treated in the same hospital. This raises the question of
whether and, if so, how these hospital-specific factors should be accounted for. The answer depends
on what these factors are.
Analytically, there are two extreme positions that can be taken. The first is to ignore information
about the hospital in which patients are treated and, in effect, consider all patients as independent
observations, having no connection with one another. This is what the Ordinary Least Squares
model does. This means that hospital-specific factors that might drive costs are not taken into
account in the analysis.
The second approach recognises that some patients are connected to others by virtue of their being
treated in the same hospital. This means that patients are not independent observations but are
clustered within hospitals. By recognising that patients are clustered in this way it is possible to
determine whether or not costs are partly related to where patients are treated. There are different
ways of accounting for this clustering but with a sufficiently large dataset, as in this study, these yield
equivalent resultse. We account for this clustering by estimating Random Effects models, with the
random effect being the way to capture the effect of the particular hospital on the cost observed for
each patient.
The choice between the OLS and RE models in the context of this work depends on:
i. What explains similar costs among patients treated in the same hospital and
ii. Whether and how these similar costs should be reimbursed.
If higher costs in a particular hospital are thought to be due solely to inefficiency, the RE model
should be used to estimate the costs associated with specialised care. The RE model attributes this
inefficiency to the hospital in which it occurs, with it being captured by the hospitals random effect.
This means that the estimates of the cost of specialised care are not contaminated by the relative
efficiency with which hospitals organise their services and provide care. In contrast, the OLS
estimates of the costs of specialised care will be contaminated by variations in efficiency across
hospitals.
e
The fixed effects and random effects estimates are identical to the fourth or fifth decimal point (policy requiring only up
to the second).
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But higher costs may not be due to inefficiency. Instead they could arise for reasons entirely outside
the hospitals control. In other words, higher costs are driven entirely by exogenous factors. In this
case, there are three scenarios.
First, it might be believed that higher costs are entirely due to exogenous factors, but it is not known
exactly what the factors are or how to measure them. Consequently, it is not possible to allow for
their influence in the analysis of costs or in reimbursement arrangements. If this is the case, the
costs associated with specialised care should be based on the OLS model rather than the RE model.
The reasoning is that there might a correlation between higher exogenous costs and the provision of
specialised care. If so, the OLS estimates of the cost of specialised care will be higher than the RE
estimates. This is because some of the costs associated with these (unmeasured) exogenous factors
will be attributed to the costs of specialised care. This would allow hospitals to receive some
indirect compensation for their higher exogenous costs via payment corrections made for the
provision of specialised care, even though these are not measured or paid for directly.
The second scenario is one in which it is believed that higher costs are due to exogenous factors,
these factors are quantified, and hospitals are compensated for them explicitly in some way. The
Market Forces Factor (MFF) is an archetypical example. It has long been established that the wages
that hospitals have to pay for some types of staff and the rent and rates paid for capital inputs vary
from one part of the country to another. These cost differentials have been calculated and the MFF
is used to compensate hospitals accordingly.
In effect, the MFF adjustment means that the tariffs that hospitals are paid for providing care of a
particular type is adjusted to take account of geographical variation in input prices. Similarly, in all of
our analyses, we have adjusted Reference Costs as reported by hospitals according to each hospitals
labour and capital MFF, in the same way that tariffs are adjusted. If it is believed that the MFF is
correctly calculated and that differential input prices are the only exogenous cost influences that
hospitals face, then the RE estimates are to be preferred to the OLS estimates of the costs of
specialised care.
The third scenario is one in which there are other exogenous influences on costs over and above
differential inputs prices, but these are not accounted for either explicitly or fully in funding
arrangements. For example, teaching hospitals are often thought to have higher costs than non-
teaching hospitals, and two main reasons are advanced as to why this might be so. First, teaching
hospitals may attract patients of greater severity than non-teaching hospitals, and the HRG system
inadequately captures these severity differences. Second, training of medial students may add to
the costs of patient care. This might be because the treatment process is delayed as doctors spend
longer reviewing each patient prior to surgery or discharge so that medical students can learn from
the review process. In effect, the provision of patient care and medical education is a joint and
complementary process and it is not straightforward to disentangle these two components.
The best way to deal with the additional costs associated with such exogenous influences is to
recognise them explicitly, quantify the cost impact, and compensate hospitals for these extra costs
directly. This has long been the approach taken to funding public hospitals in the Australian State of
Victoria.f If this can be achieved, the costs associated with specialised care can be estimated
precisely and de-contaminated from the influence on cost of these exogenous factors. The RE model
would be the most appropriate means to estimate the costs of specialised care, but would also
f
http://docs2.health.vic.gov.au/docs/doc/4EA6AAD16FEF511ACA257D310004D57B/$FILE/PFG%20complete%20final%20for
%20web%20150814.pdf
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include variables that measure each of the exogenous factors. The RE model would take the
following form:
௜௞ ௣ ௣௜௞ ௠ ௠௞ெ௠ୀଵ ௞ ௜௞௉௣ୀଵ (EQ4)
With ௠௞ representing a vector of m=1M different types of exogenous factor, measured for each
hospital k. The estimated impact on costs ௠ of each of these exogenous factors can themselves be
used to inform how reimbursement arrangements might be modified to compensate hospitals for
the unavoidable costs that they face. With all these exogenous factors taken into account, the
random effect ௞ for each hospital can be interpreted as capturing its cost efficiency relative to
other hospitals.
Only if a payment for these exogenous influences was not to be made would estimates from the OLS
model be preferred to those from the RE model in assessing the additional costs of specialised care.
This second best option would at least make some allowance for the costs associated with
exogenous factors, but only indirectly and rather opaquely.
It cannot be pre-determined whether the estimates of the costs of specialised care are higher for the
OLS model than the RE model. OLS estimates will be higher if:
i. Specialised care is more expensive than non-specialised care and
ii. Specialised care is concentrated in hospitals that are either less efficient or more likely to
be subject to cost-increasing exogenous factors.
In contrast, OLS estimates may be lower than RE estimates if:
i. Specialised care is more expensive than non-specialised care but
ii. Hospitals that concentrate (ie specialise) on providing specialised care are able to
provide such care at lower cost than hospitals that do not. This may be because
provision of care in such hospitals is most cost-efficient, as they benefit from economies
of scale (costs fall as more patients are treated) and economies of specialisation (lower
costs arise from more stream-lined activities and greater expertise).
Table 3 Summary of model options
Explanation Choice of model
Inefficiency RE
Different factor prices RE + MFF adjustment
Other unavoidable costs OLS if not otherwise reimbursed
RE + specific reimbursement
3.4 Model specifications
We specify six different models, each of which is estimated as an OLS and RE model. The rationale
for each model and its defining features are described below.
Model 1
The first model analyses the relationship between the PSS markers and the full cost of the patients
stay in hospital, including excess bed day costs and unbundled costs. Thus:
x The dependent variable is the patients standardised cost ௜௞ ௜௛௞ ௛.
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x The costs include the cost of core HRGs to which the patient is allocated, the costs of
unbundled components, and the costs associated with excess bed days beyond the
trimpoint of the HRG to which they are allocated.
x All patients with cost information are included in the analysis.
Model 2
Our second model takes the same form as the first, but excludes patients allocated to HRGs in which
everyone receives specialised care (100% specialised) or in which nobody does (0% specialised).
In an ideal HRG-based reimbursement system all patients requiring more expensive specialised care
would be grouped into the same HRG. However, in practice patients receiving a particular type of
specialised service are allocated across a range of HRGs, as figure 1 indicated. Some of those HRGs
are fully specialised - everyone allocated to them receives specialised care. This is because the HRG
itself is defined using the ICD or OPCS codes that are also used as indicators of specialised care.
Conversely, a handful of HRGs contain no patients that received specialised care. For both types of
HRG the core tariff will properly account for the costs of specialised (or non-specialised) care.
Consequently, retaining patients allocated to these HRGs in the analysis would be inappropriate for
the estimation of the influence of specialised care for patients allocated to the other HRGs. This is
because there will be no cost differential for those in fully specialised HRGs, so including them in the
analysis will dilute the difference for those HRGs comprising a mix of patients that do or do not
receive specialised care. Including fully non-specialised (0% specialised) HRGs in the analysis would
be inappropriate, because there can be no cost differentiation for patients allocated to these HRGs
simply because none of them received specialised care.
Model 3
The third model is that most appropriate to inform payment arrangements relating to compensation
for the higher costs of specialised care. It has the following features:
x As for model 2, patients allocated to fully specialised or fully non-specialised HRGs are
excluded, because the core tariff properly accounts for their costs, by HRG construction.
x The dependent variable is re-defined to capture only the costs associated with the core
HRGs to which the patient is allocated, defined as ௜௛௞כ , with the patients re-
standardised cost now defined as ௜௞כ ௜௛௞כ ௛כ .
The reason for focussing solely on the costs associated with the patients core HRG is because costs
associated with excess bed days and unbundled activities are compensated separately via excess
bed-day rates and unbundled payments. If cost differentials are observed when considering only the
core HRG costs there are grounds for making corrections to the base HRG tariffs. As such, this is the
preferred specification for informing refinement of the base HRG tariff.
Model 4
The fourth model takes the same form as the third, but introduces a further condition for identifying
whether or not someone has received specialised care. This condition reflects the fact that some
hospitals have been designated by the Department of Health as eligible for top-up payments for
some specialised services. Such hospitals undertake more specialised spells than do other hospitals.
For the PSS and PSS-SMT service lines listed in Table 4 below, a patient is defined as receiving
specialised care if one of the PSS ICD10 or OPCS codes was present in their medical record and they
were treated at an eligible provider. We assess the sensitivity of results in Model 3 to imposition of
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the eligibility condition that these types of specialised services have to be delivered by eligible
providers.
Table 4 Eligibility criteria by type of specialised service
NPCoC CRG
Eligibility in
both PSS and
SMT
New service in
SMT with
eligibility
Pre-existing in PSS
but eligibility criteria
only imposed in SMT
A01 - Cystic Fibrosis 10Z
A02  Hepatobiliary 19T, 19V
A07 - Renal Transplantation 11T
A09 - Complex Invasive Cardiology 13F
A10 - Cardiac Surgery 13E
A11 - Pulmonary Hypertension 13G
A12 - Specialised Dermatology 24A, 24B, 24Y, 24Z
A14 - Specialised Respiratory 29M 23G,29S
B01  Radiotherapy 01R
B03  Cancer 01I
B05  Haemophilia 03Z
B07 - Infectious Diseases 18A
B09 - Immunology and Allergy 16Z, 17Z
B11 - Upper Gastrointestinal Surgery 01U
B12  Sarcoma 01L, 01O
B13  Central Nervous System Tumours 01Q
B14 - Specialised Urology 01N, 01X, 01Z
B16 - Complex Head and Neck 01M
B17 - Teenage and Young Adults Cancer 01T
C02 - High and Medium Secure Mental Health 22S
C03 - MH Services for the Deaf 22B, 22D
D03 - Adult Neurosurgery 08S
D04  Neuroscience 08D
D06  Burns 09Z
D07 - Cleft Lip and Palate 15Z
D13 - Spinal Cord Injury 06A
D14 - Spinal Surgery 06Z
E02 - Paediatric Surgery 23Q 23X
E03 - Paediatric Medicine 23J 23S
E04 - Paediatric Cancer 01G 23A
E05 - Congenital Heart Service 13J
E09 - Paediatric Neuroscience 23M
E10 - Complex Gynaecology 04F
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Model 5
Our fifth model analyses whether the costs associated with lengthy hospital stays are related to
receipt of specialised care. The rationale for this model is that hospitals receive additional excess
bed day payments for patients that stay beyond their HRG trimpoint.
The purpose of this analysis is to assess whether the cost of an extra day in hospital is higher for
patients that received specialised care than for those that did not. If cost differentials are observed,
there is an argument for adjusting excess bed day payments accordingly, perhaps at a different rate
to the adjustment made to the corresponding base tariff. The model has the following features:
x Only patients that stay beyond their HRG trimpoint are included, some 3% of the
analytical sample used in Model 1.
x Only excess bed day costs are analysed, with the patients re-standardised cost defined
as ௜௞௘ ௜௛௞௘ ௛௘.
Model 6
Our sixth model explores variation in length of stay (LoS) rather than costs. Our assignment of
Reference Costs means that patients from the same hospital allocated to the same HRG will have
different costs if they: have different Points of Delivery, are treated in different specialties, have
more than one FCE, trigger unbundled HRGs, and have excess lengths of stay beyond their HRG
trimpoint. But, self-evidently and as is common in many studies of hospital costs, patients that share
the same characteristics used for cost assignment will have the same costs. This means that the
Reference Costs are not truly patient-level costs, which limits our ability to detect and attribute
differences in costs to the provision of specialised care.
Recognising this, we also analyse variation in length of stay rather than costs. LoS is sometimes used
as a proxy for resource use (Street et al., 2012) and while some patients might be assigned the same
RC, LoS has the advantage of being accurately measured for each individual patient. Our model for
LoS follows the specification of the cost model except that the dependent variable is defined as the
patients standardised LoS, ௜௞௅ ௜௛௞ ௛ where ௜௛௞ is the length of stay of patient i in HRG
h in hospital k and ௛ is the national average length of stay of all patients allocated to the
patients core HRG h. All patients are included in this analysis, including those for whom cost
information is lacking.
3.5 Financial impact analysis
Having estimated cost differentials for individual patients, we then calculate the additional costs
associated with each specialised service at national level. This involves multiplying the national
number of cases for each specialised service by the additional cost associated with that service.
Given that ௣௜ if the patient received PSS specialised care of type p, and 0 otherwise, the
number of cases receiving specialised care is simply:
௣ ௣௜ூ௜ୀଵ (EQ5)
We calculate ௣ using the HES cleaned dataset, not just the subset of patients for whom costs are
available.
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To estimate the additional costs, we calculate the sum of national average cost across all the HRGs
to which patients with a given PSS marker are allocated. For a given PSS marker p, ௜௣כ is the
average national cost for the core HRG associated with patient i. This means that
௣ ௜௣כொ೛௣ୀଵ (EQ6)
indicates the total cost of patients with a given PSS marker, based on the average cost of treatment.
The overall financial impact associated with the PSS markers is then calculated as:
௣ ௣ ௣ (EQ7)
where ௣ are the estimates from model 3.
3.6 Concentration indices and ratios
To assess the concentration of specialised services among the 230 NHS hospitals in the dataset, we
construct Gini coefficients. The Gini coefficient ௣ for a particular PSS marker p is calculated
according to the formula:
௣ ௄ାଵ௄ିଵ ଶכσ ఛ೛ೖ௑೛ೖೖ಼సభ௄(௄ିଵ)ఓ೛
(EQ8)
where K is the number of all hospitals in our sample (K=230) and ௣ is the mean number of
specialised patients of type p across all hospitals. We rank all hospital according to the number of
specialised patients, with the hospital performing the most specialised activity ranked first. ௞ is the
rank of hospital k with ௣௞ patients receiving specialised care of type
We are also interested in the concentration of specialised services among different HRGs. Although
the Gini coefficient is a relevant measure of concentration, because of the large number of HRGs,
the Gini coefficient will always be very close to 1. Instead we calculate concentration ratios
analogous to the Four-Firm measure used to measure industry structure (Siegfried, 1975).
The concentration ratio is the percentage of total specialised activity of type p allocated to the H
HRGs that account for the largest amount of this type of specialised care and is calculated as:
௣௛ ௛ு௛ୀଵ
(EQ9)
where ௛ is the share of activity provided in the h-th largest HRG by volume of specialised activity of
type p. The Four-HRG can then be written as: ସ௛ ௛ସ௛ୀଵ .
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4. Descriptive statistics
The volumes of observations in HES and in our analytical samples are provided in Table 5, including
the number of patients identified as having received specialised care.
Table 5 Summary of HES and analytical samples
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
HES Sample HES Sample HES Sample
All patients 16,599,033 12,286,246 16,592,681 12,544,761 16,964,893 12,474,184
Specialised 1,796,842 763,123 1,908,239 809,605 2,015,215 792,974
A detailed breakdown for each PSS marker is provided in Table 6. The largest volume in HES is for
NCBPS01C Chemotherapy, but only a small proportion (5%) of such patients appear in the analytical
sample because many of these patients are assigned to zero cost HRGs. The same is true for
NCBPS01R Radiotherapy (10%) and NCBPS10Z Cystic fibrosis (3%). For other PSS markers, the
difference between the HES and analytical samples is much less pronounced.
Note that some PSS markers have very low volumes, with six having fewer than 100 patients in
2013/14, namely:
x NCBPS04D Women - Complex Urinary and Faecal Incontinence & Genital Prolapse;
x NCBPS08R Neurosciences  Neuroradiology;
x NCBPS23Y Childrens services - Paediatric Pain Management;
x NCBPS28Z Hyperbaric Oxygen Treatment;
x NCBPS29A Respiratory - Pulmonary vascular services;
x NCBPS33B Colorectal - Complex Inflammatory Bowel disease
18 CHE Research Paper 118
Table 6 HES and analytical samples for each PSS markers
HES Sample HES Sample HES Sample
Chemotherapy 667,642 47,186 723,431 38,815 782,697 41,417
PET-CT 744 <6 1,020 455 1,290 500
Radiotherapy 79,774 7,363 95,742 11,515 101,472 10,603
Stereotactic Radiosurgery 1,397 192 1,627 1,298 1,628 1,197
Teenage and Young Adults Cancer 14,270 6,829 13,521 6,505 13,456 5,921
Rare Cancers (Adult) 60,329 29,364 62,886 30,769 64,478 30,029
Bone Marrow Transplantation 3,025 1,846 3,250 2,086 3,378 2,292
Haemophilia 6,314 5,264 5,819 4,179 5,585 3,673
Women - Complex Minimal Access 1,525 1,274 1,761 1,617 2,244 1,961
Women - Fetal Medicine 180 168 139 132 145 125
Women - Complex Urinary and Faecal 16 14 20 18 35 35
Women - Maternal Medicine 44,174 39,629 45,870 41,669 45,142 41,614
Spinal - Spinal Surgery 12,009 9,221 12,057 9,977 11,690 8,291
Neurosciences - Neurology 122,866 96,650 131,733 111,882 144,318 121,581
Neurosciences - Neurophysiology 174 87 202 158 237 232
Neurosciences - Neuroradiology 32 13 17 12 15 13
Neurosciences - Neurosurgery 75,177 56,095 77,055 64,784 79,986 61,308
Burns Care 5,725 2,948 5,852 3,493 6,797 2,009
Cystic fibrosis 14,083 747 14,268 620 13,696 426
Renal Services - Access for dialysis 15,764 13,323 16,519 13,488 17,203 12,255
Renal Services - Renal Transplantation 10,584 9,296 11,022 9,561 11,852 8,796
Cardiac - Cardiac electrophysiology 6,859 5,671 6,945 5,892 7,235 6,028
Cardiac - Inherited heart disorders 5,922 3,955 6,015 4,211 6,260 4,163
Cardiac - Cardiac surgery 45,100 27,418 43,450 29,891 43,488 28,249
Cardiac - PPCI and Structural Heart Disease 48,612 30,563 50,161 35,241 50,482 27,376
Cardiac - Pulmonary hypertension 6,239 4,389 1,937 1,225 1,153 907
Cardiac - Cardiovascular magnetic 4,517 8 5,484 1,526 6,123 1,726
Cardiac - Other 20,354 15,791 22,571 18,019 25,755 19,575
Adult Congenital Heart Disease 6,945 4,185 6,342 4,589 6,356 4,175
Cleft Lip Palate 2,969 2,811 2,851 2,559 2,930 2,276
Immunology 10,968 9,760 12,659 7,664 14,550 9,142
Allergy 2,538 1,971 3,575 2,278 3,809 2,292
Infectious Diseases Adult 343 279 221 164 379 241
Infectious Diseases Paeds 308 247 214 179 203 113
Hepatology & Pancreatic 4,036 2,342 4,030 2,834 4,178 2,847
Mental Health - Gender Dysphoria 163 160 170 168 175 175
Children - Cancer 53,896 25,405 54,366 23,117 55,693 20,860
Children - Cardiac 17,853 8,645 17,723 8,497 18,169 7,713
Children - Endocrinology 3,932 3,671 4,488 4,247 4,548 4,270
Children - Gastroenterology 74,283 62,385 78,175 67,537 82,217 65,854
Children - Haematology 2,362 1,919 2,342 1,881 2,493 1,764
Children - Neurosciences 16,521 9,071 16,904 11,948 16,824 11,014
Children - Ophthalmology 7,780 6,725 8,089 7,213 8,676 7,282
Children - Renal 13,836 9,593 17,531 6,529 19,547 7,271
Children - Respiratory 9,667 7,184 11,232 8,943 11,825 9,151
Children - Rheumatology 7,869 6,047 8,113 7,134 8,911 7,379
Children - Surgery 123,421 60,690 130,441 63,266 137,885 63,077
Childrens services - Paediatric Pain 25 25 33 33 21 18
Hyperbaric Oxygen Treatment 17 12 8 8 11 9
Respiratory - Pulmonary vascular services 274 178 49 30 33 23
Respiratory - Complex thoracic surgery 41,743 27,615 39,175 29,396 37,283 27,800
Respiratory - Management of central 3,103 1,901 3,161 2,120 3,428 2,209
Respiratory - Interstitial lung disease 10,919 8,285 11,231 9,148 12,007 9,330
Respiratory - Other 23,365 13,953 26,203 16,442 27,326 16,427
Vascular Services 7,378 4,839 7,471 5,323 7,742 5,581
Ears - Cochlear Implants 1,250 1,150 1,096 1,006 1,086 970
Ears - Bone anchored hearing aids 1,388 1,370 1,302 1,296 1,513 1,505
Ears - Middle Ear Implants 119 113 102 99 101 99
Colorectal - Incontinence 1,692 1,090 1,870 1,350 1,826 1,270
Colorectal - Complex Inflammatory Bowel 88 63 105 84 91 75
Colorectal - Transanal Endoscopic 535 503 585 525 543 497
Orthopaedic Surgery 1,999 1,637 1,957 1,655 1,942 1,628
Orthopaedic Surgery - revisions 187 176 191 180 138 123
Morbid Obesity Surgery 9,167 8,252 8,322 7,549 6,809 6,208
Ophthalmology 20,836 20,004 23,087 21,647 24,435 23,022
Haemoglobinopathy - Sickle Cell 13,941 13,553 16,962 12,663 19,947 10,827
Haemoglobinopathy - Thalassaemia 8,872 8,651 9,264 7,857 9,658 8,121
Highly Specialised 16,847 11,355 16,225 11,409 12,067 8,034
2011/12 2012/13 2012/13
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5. Estimates of the costs of specialised care
5.1 Model 1
x The dependent variable is the patients standardised full cost of treatment ௜௞ ௜௛௞ ௛.
x The costs include the cost of core HRGs to which the patient is allocated, the costs of
unbundled components, and the costs associated with excess bed days beyond the
trimpoint of the HRG to which they are allocated.
x All patients with cost information are included in the analysis.
Worksheet Model1 in the accompanying spreadsheet reports the number of patient spells and
percentage cost differentials for the analyses that apply Model 1 estimated using both OLS and RE
for all three years.
Most of the PSS markers are positive and significant, with the differentials being higher for the OLS
than RE model. The results are summarised in Figure 1, which includes only those PSS markers with
more than 100 patients in the analytical sample and for which the estimated coefficient is
statistically significant (p<0.0001). Up to six bars appear for each marker, ordered first by year and
then for the OLS and RE models.
The figure makes it clear that, generally but not universally, patients that have received specialised
care tend to have significantly higher costs than other patients who have not received specialised
care allocated to the same set of HRGs. Bars extending to the right of the 0% axis indicate where
this is the case. For some PSS markers, notably NCBPS01S Stereotactic Radiosurgery, costs appear
lower.
For most PSS markers, a positive or negative difference is found across all three years and both OLS
and RE models, although the size of the difference might vary, as evidenced by variation in the
heights of the six bars for each PSS marker.
For some PSS markers, there are fewer than six bars, an absence indicating a lack of statistical
significance for the year or model in question. This is particularly likely for PSS markers for which
there are some volumes. An example is NCBPS04C Women - Fetal Medicine.
For further ease of interpretation in Table 7, we summarise these findings according to a
categorisation of the size of the differential (again only for those PSS markers that are statistically
significant and for which there are at least 100 patients). Taking the RE results for 2013/14, the cost
differential between those that do and do not receive specialised care is more than 50% for six PSS
markers; for 18 of these the difference is more than 25%; and for 29 it is more than 10%. At the
other extreme, the cost differential is more than minus 50% for one PSS marker (NCBPS01S -
Stereotactic Radiosurgery), more than minus 25% for four PSS markers, and more than minus 10%
for nine PSS markers. The implication is that, for these markers, patients that received the
specialised care in question are less expensive than other patients assigned to the same HRG. This
summary differs little for the earlier years, but there are fewer PSS markers in each category if
estimating Model 1 as an RE rather than OLS model.
20 CHE Research Paper 118
Table 7 Summary of Model 1 results by size of difference
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 10 5 10 6 10 6
25 24 19 21 20 20 18
10 32 29 31 29 32 29
(10) 6 7 6 8 9 9
(25) 4 2 3 3 4 4
(50) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 2 Summary of Model 1 results
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5.2 Model 2
x The dependent variable is the patients standardised full cost of treatment ௜௞ ௜௛௞ ௛.
x The costs include the cost of core HRGs to which the patient is allocated, the costs of
unbundled components, and the costs associated with excess bed days beyond the
trimpoint of the HRG to which they are allocated.
x Patients allocated to fully specialised or non-specialised HRGs are dropped from the analysis.
The overall proportion of patients allocated to fully (non) specialised has increased over time, from
0.2% in 2011/12 to 0.41% in 2012/13 to 0.56% in 2013/14. The increasing proportion of patients
assigned to HRGs in which everyone receives specialised care is probably a reflection of the ongoing
revisions made to the HRG classification system. Omitting patients allocated to fully specialised and
non-specialised HRGs from the analysis reduces the number of specialised patients in the analysis by
16,701 (2.2%) for 2011/12, 23,977 (3.0%) in 2012/13 and 25,362 (3.2%) in 2013/14.
In all three years, almost all patients are dropped for NCBPS02Z Bone Marrow Transplantation,
NCBPS10Z Cystic fibrosis, NCBPS32A Ears - Cochlear Implants, and NCBPS32B Ears - Bone anchored
hearing aids while 30% of those receiving specialised NCBPS35Z Morbid Obesity Surgery are
dropped.
There are also reductions in numbers for some types of Childrens services, notably NCBPS23F
Children - Gastroenterology (17% fewer in 2013/14), NCBPS23N Children - Ophthalmology (11%) and
NCBPS23X Children - Surgery (5%), the impact of dropping these patients being to increase the
estimated cost differential for these services by 2%.
As might be expected given that few patients are dropped, there is little difference in the results
between Model 1 and Model 2, Figures 2 and 3 showing a similar pattern and the number of PSS
markers in each differential category being similar in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 8 Summary of Model 2 results by size of difference
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 10 5 9 6 11 7
25 24 20 19 20 21 19
10 32 29 29 29 34 30
(10) 5 6 4 8 9 8
(25) 4 3 2 3 4 4
(50) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Where there are differences between the results from Model 1 and Model 2, these will arise for
those PSS markers for which greater numbers of patients have been omitted from the analysis. For
2013/14, the PSS markers with the greatest reductions in numbers and the changes in the
percentage cost differences are shown in Table 9. For only four of these were the observed cost
differentials statistically significant, but for one these (NCBPS13X Adult Congenital Heart Disease),
this was negative. For the other three PSS markers, the cost differential increases when patients
allocated to fully (non) specialised HRGs are dropped, but never by more than 2.5%. Full details are
in worksheet Model2 in the accompanying spreadsheet.
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5.3 Model 3
x The dependent variable captures only the costs associated with the core HRGs to which the
patient is allocated, defined as ௜௛௞כ , with the patients re-standardised cost defined as௜௞כ ௜௛௞כ ௛כ .
x Patients allocated to fully specialised or non-specialised HRGs are dropped from the analysis.
The results for Model 3 are reported in worksheet Model3 in the accompanying spreadsheet, this
model dropping excess bed-day and unbundled costs in the construction of the dependent variable.
These results (or those from Model 4) should be used as the basis for discussing corrections to the
base HRG tariffs.
For two PSS markers, Chemotherapy and Radiotherapy, most costs are unbundled and reimbursed
separately to the core HRG. Once these costs are removed, the cost differentials disappear almost
entirely for Chemotherapy and are substantially lower for Radiotherapy (from 111% to 51% in
2013/14).
Cost differentials are also substantially lower in all three years for Neurology (from 31% to 11% in
2013/14), Pulmonary hypertension (from 17% to 11%), Cardiovascular magnetic resonance imaging
(128% to 75%), Immunology (18% to -10%) and Childrens Surgery (from 43% to 21%). This implies
that excess bedday and unbundled payments compensate partly, but not fully, for the additional
costs associated with these types of specialised care.
There are a couple of PSS markers for which the estimated cost differential increases for all three
years, these being Childrens cancer care (9% to 19% in 2013/14) and Childrens cardiac care (18% to
26%).
Restricting the analysis only to the costs of the core HRGs generally means that cost differentials are
less pronounced, the implication being that the number of PSS markers in each of the differential
categories is smaller in Table 10 than it was in Table 8.
Table 10 Summary of Model 3 results by size of difference
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 6 4 5 4 8 6
25 18 14 22 18 19 15
10 31 27 36 33 32 29
(10) 5 6 5 5 8 8
(25) 3 3 2 2 4 2
(50) 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 4 Summary of Model 3 results
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5.4 Model 4
x The dependent variable captures only the costs associated with the core HRGs to which the
patient is allocated, defined as ௜௛௞כ , with the patients re-standardised cost defined as௜௞כ ௜௛௞כ ௛כ .
x Patients allocated to fully specialised or non-specialised HRGs are dropped from the analysis.
x Patients are identified as having specialised care if the appropriate ICD10 and OPCS codes
are in their medical record and they were treated at eligible providers
Model 4 involves imposition of the condition that patients have to be treated in eligible hospitals for
identification of whether or not they were deemed to have received specialised care. This reduces
the number of patients identified as having specialised care by 16,253 (2.18%) in 2011/12, 21,545
(2.74%) in 2012/13 and 20,534 (2.68%) in 2013/14. The results for Model 4 are reported in
worksheet Model4 in the accompanying spreadsheet.
The impact on the cost differential of imposing these eligibility conditions for identification of
whether or not somebody had specialised care will vary from one PSS marker to another, being most
pronounced in those PSS markers where the greatest number of patients are de-identified as
having received specialised care. For 2013/14, the PSS markers with the greatest reductions in
numbers and the changes in the percentage cost differences are shown in Table 11 below.
Table 11 PSS markers most affected by imposition of eligibility conditions
N de-
identified
M3
OLS
M4
OLS Diff M3 RE M4 RE Diff
NCBPS03Z Haemophilia 770 26% 44% 18.2% 23% 36% 13.3%
NCBPS06Z
Spinal - Spinal
Surgery 2,167 -13% -13% 0.0% -14% -17% 2.9%
NCBPS08S
Neurosciences 
Neurosurgery 1,268 44% 52% 8.1% 41% 44% 3.4%
NCBPS13E
Cardiac - Cardiac
surgery 2,909 24% 26% 1.3% 22% 69% 47.3%
NCBPS13F
Cardiac - PPCI and
Structural Heart
Disease 5,551 14% 15% 0.7% 13% 14% 0.6%
NCBPS13G
Cardiac - Pulmonary
hypertension 720 11% NS na 12% NS na
NCBPS29M
Respiratory -
Interstitial lung
disease 6,207 3% -11% -14.6% NS -29% -26.6%
NS: not significant; na not applicable
For all but two of these PSS markers, the cost differential is greater for Model 4 than it was for
Model 3. This implies that patients that received specialised care had more costly care if treated in
eligible rather than non-eligible providers. The 29 PSS markers with differentials in excess of 10%
are the same for both Models 3 and 4 under the RE specification (Table 12).
26 CHE Research Paper 118
Table 12 Summary of Model 4 results by size of difference
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 5 4 6 4 7 8
25 14 14 21 17 19 16
10 27 27 36 32 30 29
(10) 5 7 6 7 10 8
(25) 3 3 1 4 4 4
(50) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5 Summary of Model 4 results
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5.5 Model 5
x Only patients that stay being their HRG trimpoint are included;
x Only excess bed day costs are analysed, with the patients re-standardised cost defined as௜௞௘ ௜௛௞௘ ௛௘.
Model 5 focusses only those patients that stayed beyond the trimpoint for the core HRG to which
they are allocated. This reduces the sample to 354012 (2.9% of that in Model 1) for 2011/12,
461540 (3.7%) for 2012/13 and 417866 (3.3%) for 2013/14.
The purpose of this analysis is to assess whether the cost of an extra day in hospital is higher for
patients that received specialised care than for those that did not. If so, there are empirical grounds
for increasing excess bed day payments for such patients accordingly.
Results are summarised in Table 13 and Figure 5. As can be seen, there are few PSS markers in
which a differential excess bed day cost is observed, and for only a handful of these is the
differential in excess of 25%. The policy implications of these results are that:
x For those PSS markers where a cost differential is observed, there are grounds for
adjusting the excess bed day payment accordingly. The excess bed day adjustment might
be at different percentage to that applied to the base tariff adjustment.
x For those PSS markers where no cost differential is observed, there is no basis for
adjusting the excess bed day tariff. This implies that there are some PSS markers for
which an adjustment might be made to the core tariff but for which no adjustment
should be applied to the excess bed day payment.
Full results for Model 5 are reported in worksheet Model5 in the accompanying spreadsheet.
Table 13 Summary of Model 5 results by size of difference
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 1 0 2 1 2 2
25 4 1 6 6 4 4
10 7 7 13 12 8 9
(10) 0 0 0 2 0 3
(25) 0 0 0 1 0 1
(50) 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 6 Summary of Model 5 results
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5.6 Model 6
x the dependent variable is defined as the patients standardised LoS, ௜௞௅ ௜௛௞ ௛
x All patients are included in the analysis, including those with missing cost information.
Our sixth model explores variation in length of stay (LoS) rather than costs. The advantage of using
LoS is that it is measured specifically for each patient; the disadvantage being that LoS is only a
partial measure of costs.
The results for this analysis are reported in worksheet Model6 in the accompanying spreadsheet.
We are more likely to find significant positive differentials for the PSS markers when analysing costs
rather than LoS. Compare the RE results from Model 3 and Model 6, the number of PSS markers
where the differential is in excess of 10% is:
x 27/69 (Model 3) and 7/69 (Model 6) in 2011/12
x 33/69 (Model 3) and 5/69 (Model 6) in 2012/13
x 29/69 (Model 3) and 15/69 (Model 6) in 2013/14
It is also notable that observed differentials in LoS are seldom of a consistent size or significance
across all three years or between the OLS and RE specifications, as is evident from Figure 6. This lack
of consistency suggests that it would be unwise to base pricing decisions on the basis of LoS.
Table 14 Summary of Model 6 results by size of difference
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 6 4 4 4 7 5
25 6 7 4 5 10 11
10 6 7 4 5 10 15
(10) 1 1 1 0 4 4
(25) 1 1 1 0 4 3
(50) 0 0 1 0 2 2
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Figure 7 Summary of Model 6 results
5.7 PSS shadow monitoring tool
As described in section 2.2, an updated version of the PSS rules was released in May 2015, known as
the PSS Shadow Monitoring tool (PSS-SMT). Data for 2013/14 have been run through the PSS-SMT.
The analysis involves a substitution of PSS definitions with PSS-SMT definitions of specialised care.
We then apply Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 to identify cost differentials arising from applying the
refined PSS-SMT system for identifying whether or not someone received specialised care.
The results are split into two parts. The first set of results is for those PSS markers for which labelling
is the same under both PSS and PSS-SMT, even though each of these PSS markers may have been
subject to revision of some form or another. The most significant of these revisions are summarised
in Table 15. The second set is for new PSS-SMT markers.
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Table 15 Changes to original PSS markers introduced by PSS-SMT
PSS
PSS-
SMT
D
iffe
re
n
ce
%D
iffe
re
n
ce
Reason
NCBPS04E Women - Maternal
Medicine
41,612 - -41,612 -100%
Category dropped from SMT
NCBPS01C Chemotherapy 41,389 74,778 33,389 81% Expansion from 8 qualifying OPCS
codes to 19
NCBPS13K Cardiac - Other 19,567 - -19,567 -100% Category dropped from SMT
NCBPS01Y Rare Cancers
(Adult)
30,019 12,121 -17,898 -60% Reduction from 166 ICD codes to
65
NCBPS23X Children - Surgery 59,256 45,067 -14,189 -24% Addition of eligibility criteria and
slight decrease in qualifying OPCS
codes
NCBPS23M Children -
Neurosciences
11,010 - -11,010 -100% Change from treatment speciality
qualification to OPCS codes
NCBPS23B Children - Cardiac 7,283 7 -7,276 -100% Change from any code in ICD or
OPCS list to code in ICD list and
code in OPCS list
NCBPS11T Renal Services -
Renal
Transplantation
8,793 1,759 -7,034 -80%
Addition of eligibility criteria
NCBPS01T Teenage and Young
Adults Cancer
5,864 12,300 6,436 110% Increase in ICD qualifying codes
from 440 to 759
NCBPS29M Respiratory -
Interstitial lung
disease
3,123 3,622 499 5%
Qualifying ICD codes have
increased from 7 to 27
NCBPS13F Cardiac - PPCI and
Structural Heart
Disease
21,786 21,884 98 0%
Small changes to qualifying OPCS
codes and eligibility criteria
NCBPS13G Cardiac - Pulmonary
hypertension
186 4,376 4,190 462% Reason for discrepancy not
apparent
NCBPS23A Children - Cancer 20,510 18,205 -2,305 -11% Addition of eligibility criteria
NCBPS23S Children - Renal 7,205 5,196 -2,009 -28% Addition of eligibility criteria
NCBPS09Z Burns Care 2,009 3,931 1,922 96% Increase in qualifying
organisations from 22 to 28
NCBPS19Z Hepatology &
Pancreatic
2,847 2,014 -833 -29% Reduction in qualifying ICD codes
from 107 to 79
NCBPS03Z Haemophilia 2,903 2,891 -12 0% Reduction of 1 qualifying ICD code
NCBPS01R Radiotherapy 10,104 10,104 - 0% Reduction of qualifying OPCS
codes from 28 to 25
NCBPS13B Cardiac - Cardiac
electrophysiology
6,028 6,375 347 6% Increase in qualifying OPCS codes
from 25 to 29
NCBPS17Z Allergy 2,292 2,552 260 11% Increase in qualifying OPCS codes
from 6 to 9
NCBPS08R Neurosciences -
Neuroradiology
13 196 183 1408% Increase in qualifying OPCS codes
from 276 to 308
NCBPS04C Women - Fetal
Medicine
125 - -125 -100%
Category dropped from SMT
NCBPS15Z Cleft Lip Palate 2,161 2,192 31 1% Increase in qualifying OPCS codes
from 80 to 84
NCBPS16Z Immunology 9,140 9,079 -61 -1% Addition of eligibility criteria
NCBPS11C Renal Services -
Access for dialysis
12,255 12,290 35 0% Increase in qualifying OPCS codes
from 17 to 19
NCBPS23E Children -
Endocrinology
4,270 4,279 9 0% Increase in treatment speciality
qualifying codes
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Costs differentials for the original PSS markers are shown in Figure 8, with changes summarised
according to the size of the effect in Table 8. For these markers, applying the new PSS-SMT
identification rules tends to reduction in observed cost differentials. This is evident from the
reduction in the number of PSS markers in each differential category for Model 1 compared to Table
7, for Model 2 compared to Table 8, and for Model 3 compared to Table 10.
Table 16 Summary of PSS-SMT results by size of difference for original PSS markers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 7 6 8 6 4 3
25 16 14 16 15 14 13
10 29 24 30 24 26 24
(10) 10 10 10 10 11 10
(25) 5 6 4 5 5 5
(50) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 8 Summary of PSS-SMT results for original PSS markers
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There are 35 new PSS-SMT markers. However, some identify very few patients. Indeed, in the
2013/14 analytical sample (ie those for whom costs are available), for six PSS-SMT markers no
patients are identified as having received this type of specialised care, and for ten others there are
fewer than 100 patients. The number of spells for each of the new PSS-SMT markers is shown in
Table 17.
Table 17 Number of spells for the new PSS-SMT markers
Code Label Spells
NCBPS01G Retinoblastoma service 23
NCBPS01I Choriocarcinoma 21
NCBPS01J Colorectal - Anal cancer 1,981
NCBPS01K Thoracic surgery - Malignant mesothelioma 2,267
NCBPS01L Sarcoma 831
NCBPS01M Head and Neck cancer 18,432
NCBPS01N Kidney, bladder and prostate cancer 9,311
NCBPS01O Sarcoma 680
NCBPS01Q Rare cancers - Brain and Central Nervous System 3,923
NCBPS01U Upper gastrointestinal surgery 13,498
NCBPS01V Rare cancers- biliary tract cancer 1,256
NCBPS01W Rare cancers - liver cancer 14,312
NCBPS01X Specialised Urology - Penile cancer 579
NCBPS01Z Specialised Urology - Testicular cancer 1,185
NCBPS04F Specialised Gynaecology - cancer 18,660
NCBPS06A Spinal cord injury 1,254
NCBPS08D Neuromyelitis optica 82
NCBPS13J Pulmonary hypertension (children) 87
NCBPS13N Heart and lung transplantation <6
NCBPS19T Hepatobiliary - liver transplant 7
NCBPS19V Hepatobiliary - pancreatic cancer 3,671
NCBPS22C Tier 4 CAMHS <6
NCBPS23G Adult ataxia telangiectasia service <6
NCBPS23Q Paediatric Surgery - Trauma and Orthopaedics 16,351
NCBPS24A Dermatology - Epidermolysis bullosa 199
NCBPS24B Xeroderma pigmentosum <6
NCBPS24Y Rare skin cancer 17,573
NCBPS24Z Dermatology 3,522
NCBPS29S Respiratory - severe and difficult to control asthma 37
The cost differentials from the three models for the new PSS-SMT markers are summarised in Table
18 and Figure 9. For the RE version of Model 3, there are only 4 markers where the cost differentials
are in excess of 25%. Of the new PSS-SMT markers, the one that most stands out is NCBPS06A Spinal
cord injury, for which the cost differential is upwards of 85% under each model formulation.
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Table 18 Summary of PSS-SMT results by size of difference for new PSS-SMT markers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
50 3 2 3 2 2 1
25 6 5 6 5 5 4
10 7 7 7 7 8 6
(10) 0 0 0 1 2 2
(25) 0 0 0 0 1 1
(50) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 9 Summary of PSS-SMT results for new PSS-SMT markers
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6. Impact analysis and payment mechanisms
In order to illustrate the practical impact of accommodating the estimated additional costs of
specialised activity we take our results from the RE specification of Model 3 and calculate the
financial impact. This involves taking the number of patients nationally (in HES) who have the PSS
marker in question, and applying the percentage cost differential impact to the core tariff to which
the patients with this PSS marker are allocated, as specified in Equation 7. In summing the amounts
associated with all the positive significant markers, the overall additional costs associated with
provision of specialised care are estimated to amount £572m in 2011/12, £628m in 2012/13 and
£589m in 2013/14.
Of interest is not just the expected cost of the specialised activity, but also whether there are any
preferred methods of payment and what impact they may have on individual providers.
In Figure 10 we plot each of the PSS markers with a significant positive cost differential in terms of
its national financial impact and the Gini coefficient measuring hospital concentration. A coefficient
of 0 would indicate that activity is spread out evenly across all hospitals and a value of one would
indicate that all activity is concentrated in just one provider.
Figure 10 Gini coefficient and financial impact for each PSS marker
As would be expected, in general most of the specialised services seem to be relatively concentrated
in a few hospitals with a mean value of Gini=0.88. The minimum Gini coefficient is 0.60 (for
Respiratory - Other) to and the maximum is 1 (Gender Dysphoria, Paediatric Pain Management and
Hyperbaric Oxygen Treatment). Given that specialised activity is generally highly concentrated
within particular hospitals it is clear that failing to compensate for the additional costs of specialised
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activity would not affect all hospitals equally. For example, three PSS markers stand out in the upper
right of Figure 10: Neurosciences - Neurosurgery, Cardiac surgery and Respiratory - Complex thoracic
surgery. These services are only conducted in few hospitals (Gini > 0.9) and have high costs, the
national financial impact exceeding £157m, £78m and £74m for each respectively. Failure to
account for the additional costs associated with their specialised care would therefore have a
substantial punitive effect on those few hospitals who undertake that activity.
In view of this, there is a strong case for compensating at least some specialised activity on the basis
of the observed cost differentials and the impact these higher costs may have on individual
hospitals. This raises the question of how these extra costs be compensated. The current convention
is to apply a top-up to existing HRGs, but it is also worth considering whether it would be preferable
to further refine the underlying HRGs to which patients receiving specialised care are allocated.
To address this question we calculate a further measure of concentration, this time the
concentration of specialised services across HRGs. If, on the one hand, patients receiving a
particular PSS service are allocated to just a few HRGs then there may be a case for splitting those
HRGs further to distinguish patients that receive specialised care from those that do not. On the
other hand if patients receiving specialised services are spread across many HRGs, then a top-up
would appear to be the most viable option, as sub-dividing HRGs would be unfeasible.
To assess HRG concentration we use the CR4 concentration ratio rather than the Gini coefficient.
The CR4 ratio measures the proportion of services that are in the most common 4 HRGs. As with
the Gini coefficient, higher numbers indicate greater concentration.
To illustrate our approach we examine the 29 services PSS markers where the cost differential was in
excess of 10% under the RE specification of Model 3. In Table 19 for each year we report the
number of patients nationally (in HES) who have the PSS marker in question, the percentage cost
differential (in bold if statistically significant), and applying this differential to core tariff to which the
patients with this PSS marker are allocated, as specified in Equation 7.
In Table 20, for the same markers, we report the Gini coefficient (Equation 8), describing the
concentration of this specialised activity among hospitals, and the Concentration ratio (Equation 9),
describing what proportion of this is concentrated among the four HRGs to which the patients with
this PSS marker are allocated.
We use this information to suggest recommendations about how payment arrangements might be
refined. Recommendations fall into four main categories:
1. Apply a top-up to the core tariff, reflecting the estimated cost differential, if:
x The cost differential is stable over time, in terms of both statistical significance and size.
x Activity is spread across many HRGs, indicated by a CR4<0.8.
x If the cost differential is unstable over time, review the differential when 2014/15 data
are available.
2. Apply a top-up to the core tariff in the short term, but consider sub-dividing HRGs, if:
x The cost differential is stable over time, in terms of both statistical significance and size.
x Activity is concentrated among few HRGs, indicated by a CR4>0.8.
3. Re-assessment of the criteria used to identify whether or not somebody has received
specialised care.
4. Those where no further action appears warranted, usually because matters have
changed with the introduction of the PSS-SMT.
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Table 19 Financial impact by PSS marker
Financial Impact
HES M3 RE % Impact (£000) HES M3 RE % Impact (£000) HES M3 RE % Impact (£000)
NCBPS01P PET-CT 744 147% £2,362 1,020 116% £3,883 1,290 132% £6,040
NCBPS01R Radiotherapy 79,774 35% £15,069 95,742 37% £22,385 101,472 37% £20,430
NCBPS01T Teenage and Young Adults Cancer 14,270 18% £2,475 13,521 26% £3,359 13,456 28% £3,579
NCBPS01Y Rare Cancers (Adult) 60,329 16% £18,351 62,886 17% £21,487 64,478 17% £22,775
NCBPS03Z Haemophilia 6,314 31% £1,497 5,819 28% £1,905 5,585 23% £1,229
NCBPS04C Women - Fetal Medicine 180 -6% -£16 139 -14% -£18 145 123% £521
NCBPS08O Neurosciences - Neurology 122,866 20% £32,122 131,733 20% £39,174 144,318 10% £21,308
NCBPS08S Neurosciences - Neurosurgery 75,177 42% £132,255 77,055 46% £172,147 79,986 41% £157,190
NCBPS09Z Burns Care 5,725 54% £8,214 5,852 31% £6,007 6,797 73% £15,168
NCBPS11C Renal Services - Access for 15,764 43% £15,737 16,519 8% £4,222 17,203 20% £10,084
NCBPS13C Cardiac - Inherited heart 5,922 36% £7,554 6,015 14% £3,848 6,260 16% £4,767
NCBPS13E Cardiac - Cardiac surgery 45,100 22% £78,273 43,450 24% £86,464 43,488 22% £79,265
NCBPS13F Cardiac - PPCI and Structural Heart 48,612 22% £30,554 50,161 19% £35,270 50,482 13% £25,527
NCBPS13G Cardiac - Pulmonary hypertension 6,239 9% £582 1,937 5% £256 1,153 12% £391
NCBPS13H Cardiac - Cardiovascular magnetic 4,517 23% £3,108 5,484 24% £4,921 6,123 60% £13,612
NCBPS23A Children - Cancer 53,896 5% £2,508 54,366 11% £6,360 55,693 11% £7,210
NCBPS23B Children - Cardiac 17,853 23% £13,288 17,723 21% £9,434 18,169 18% £8,660
NCBPS23M Children - Neurosciences 16,521 45% £14,014 16,904 42% £16,352 16,824 24% £9,576
NCBPS23N Children - Ophthalmology 7,780 15% £1,118 8,089 15% £1,292 8,676 30% £2,727
NCBPS23T Children - Respiratory 9,667 42% £4,399 11,232 39% £4,896 11,825 30% £4,293
NCBPS23X Children - Surgery 123,421 13% £36,093 130,441 17% £48,764 137,885 15% £45,840
NCBPS29B Respiratory - Complex thoracic 41,743 38% £91,053 39,175 31% £69,783 37,283 35% £74,736
NCBPS29E Respiratory - Management of 3,103 54% £4,520 3,161 81% £8,883 3,428 47% £5,336
NCBPS29R Respiratory - Other 23,365 11% £10,123 26,203 13% £17,262 27,326 13% £17,791
NCBPS32A Ears - Cochlear Implants 1,250 -29% -£51 1,096 -28% -£78 1,086 68% £59
NCBPS33C Colorectal - Transanal Endoscopic 535 57% £583 585 35% £529 543 55% £789
NCBPS34A Orthopaedic Surgery 1,999 13% £1,619 1,957 23% £2,203 1,942 20% £1,992
NCBPS34R Orthopaedic Surgery - revisions 187 32% £433 191 28% £354 138 32% £318
NCBPS99Z Highly Specialised 16,847 52% £26,630 16,225 69% £3,410 12,067 29% £6,569
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
38 CHE Research Paper 118
Table 20 Gini coefficient and concentration ratio by PSS marker
Concentration measures GINI CR4 GINI CR4 GINI CR4
NCBPS01P PET-CT 0.96 0.26 0.96 0.11 0.95 0.11
NCBPS01R Radiotherapy 0.97 0.82 0.97 0.84 0.97 0.86
NCBPS01T Teenage and Young Adults Cancer 0.81 0.58 0.8 0.55 0.82 0.56
NCBPS01Y Rare Cancers (Adult) 0.76 0.44 0.72 0.41 0.72 0.42
NCBPS03Z Haemophilia 0.91 0.81 0.89 0.78 0.89 0.74
NCBPS04C Women - Fetal Medicine 0.97 0.87 0.97 0.88 0.96 0.84
NCBPS08O Neurosciences - Neurology 0.88 0.5 0.87 0.52 0.86 0.52
NCBPS08S Neurosciences - Neurosurgery 0.92 0.26 0.92 0.23 0.92 0.24
NCBPS09Z Burns Care 0.98 0.75 0.97 0.9 0.97 0.88
NCBPS11C Renal Services - Access for dialysis 0.9 0.58 0.88 0.63 0.88 0.43
NCBPS13C Cardiac - Inherited heart disorders 0.73 0.81 0.7 0.45 0.69 0.43
NCBPS13E Cardiac - Cardiac surgery 0.91 0.49 0.9 0.26 0.9 0.26
NCBPS13F Cardiac - PPCI and Structural Heart Diseas 0.82 0.92 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.8
NCBPS13G Cardiac - Pulmonary hypertension 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.69 0.93 0.7
NCBPS13H Cardiac - Cardiovascular magnetic resonan 0.95 0.47 0.93 0.31 0.93 0.27
NCBPS23A Children - Cancer 0.9 0.69 0.89 0.71 0.9 0.7
NCBPS23B Children - Cardiac 0.86 0.49 0.84 0.58 0.85 0.42
NCBPS23M Children - Neurosciences 0.96 0.27 0.96 0.26 0.96 0.24
NCBPS23N Children - Ophthalmology 0.82 0.36 0.79 0.31 0.8 0.31
NCBPS23T Children - Respiratory 0.97 0.46 0.95 0.51 0.95 0.46
NCBPS23X Children - Surgery 0.81 0.36 0.78 0.37 0.79 0.38
NCBPS29B Respiratory - Complex thoracic surgery 0.92 0.38 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.32
NCBPS29E Respiratory - Management of central airw 0.86 0.36 0.84 0.4 0.84 0.38
NCBPS29R Respiratory - Other 0.66 0.31 0.6 0.22 0.6 0.2
NCBPS32A Ears - Cochlear Implants 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99
NCBPS33C Colorectal - Transanal Endoscopic Microsu 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.91 0.86
NCBPS34A Orthopaedic Surgery 0.81 0.38 0.8 0.37 0.79 0.38
NCBPS34R Orthopaedic Surgery - revisions 0.96 0.7 0.93 0.5 0.91 0.54
NCBPS99Z Highly Specialised 0.95 0.16 0.94 0.16 0.99 0.16
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
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Table 21 Recommendations by PSS marker
Comments Recommendation
NCBPS01P PET-CT This is a diagnostic imaging procedure which is an
unbundled service. Patients having PET-CT appear
across many HRGs, even more so given the change from
HRG4 to HRG4+, and this is reflected in the decreased
CR4
Consider dropping as specialised service
because it is unbundled.
NCBPS01R Radiotherapy Stable, highly concentrated among HRGs Top-up initially but consider HRG split
NCBPS01T Teenage and Young Adults
Cancer
Stable Top-up
NCBPS01Y Rare Cancers (Adult) Revised under PSS-SMT, with only a third of PSS patients
now identified under PSS-SMT
Coefficient under PSS-SMT no longer large
enough to warrant action (5%)
NCBPS03Z Haemophilia Stable, fairly concentrated among HRGs Top-up initially but consider HRG split
NCBPS04C Women - Fetal Medicine Unstable and small numbers No action - this doesn't appear in the PSS-SMT
NCBPS08O Neurosciences - Neurology Unstable, with differential falling over time Possible top-up, if differential remains in future
NCBPS08S Neurosciences - Neurosurgery All patients seen by a neurosurgeon are deemed
specialised
Top-up initially but revise definition so that it is
based on patient characteristics
NCBPS09Z Burns Care Unstable, highly concentrated among hospitals and
HRGs. There is a clearer definition of what constitutes
major burns under HRG4+
Top-up, but review when 14/15 data are
available. Consider HRG split
NCBPS11C Renal Services - Access for
dialysis
Unstable Top-up, but review when 14/15 data are
available.
NCBPS13C Cardiac - Inherited heart
disorders
Increase from 52 HRGs in HRG4 to 145 in HRG4+ cardiac
sub-chapters, so CR4 has fallen
Top-up
NCBPS13E Cardiac - Cardiac surgery Increase from 52 HRGs in HRG4 to 145 in HRG4+ cardiac
sub-chapters, so CR4 has fallen
Top-up
NCBPS13F Cardiac - PPCI and Structural
Heart Disease
Increase from 52 HRGs in HRG4 to 145 in HRG4+ cardiac
sub-chapters, so CR4 has fallen. Differentials falling over
time
Possible HRG split if differential remains in
future
NCBPS13G Cardiac - Pulmonary
hypertension
Increase from 52 HRGs in HRG4 to 145 in HRG4+ cardiac
sub-chapters, so CR4 has fallen
Top-up
NCBPS13H Cardiac - Cardiovascular
magnetic resonance
Increase from 52 HRGs in HRG4 to 145 in HRG4+ cardiac
sub-chapters, so CR4 has fallen
Top-up
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NCBPS23A Children - Cancer Stable Top-up
NCBPS23B Children - Cardiac Increase from 52 HRGs in HRG4 to 145 in HRG4+ cardiac
sub-chapters, so CR4 has fallen
Top-up, but note fewer patients identified
under PSS-SMT
NCBPS23M Children - Neurosciences Stable Top-up
NCBPS23N Children - Ophthalmology Stable Top-up
NCBPS23T Children - Respiratory Stable Top-up
NCBPS23X Children - Surgery Stable Top-up, but note fewer patients identified
under PSS-SMT
NCBPS29B Respiratory - Complex thoracic
surgery
Stable Top-up
NCBPS29E Respiratory - Management of
central airway obstruction
Unstable Top-up, but review when 14/15 data are
available.
NCBPS29R Respiratory - Other Stable differential, but not highly concentrated among
providers
Revisit definition: is this identifying rare and
complex care?
NCBPS32A Ears - Cochlear Implants Stable, highly concentrated among HRGs Top-up initially but consider HRG split
NCBPS33C Colorectal - Transanal
Endoscopic Microsurgery
Stable, highly concentrated among HRGs Top-up initially but consider HRG split
NCBPS34A Orthopaedic Surgery Stable, increase in HRGs in subchapter HA - Orth.
Trauma Procedures (goes up from 56 HRG4 to 64 HRG4+
Top-up
NCBPS34R Orthopaedic Surgery - revisions Stable, increase in HRGs in subchapter HA - Orth.
Trauma Procedures (goes up from 56 HRG4 to 64 HRG4+
Top-up, but low numbers
NCBPS99Z Highly Specialised Unstable Top-up, though not implemented under PSS-
SMT
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These recommendations for each of the 29 PSS markers are set out in Table 21. By way of
illustration we summarise the reasoning for a selected PSS marker in each category.
NCBPS13E Cardiac surgery
The recommendation is to apply a top-up to reflect the higher costs of this specialised care.
x The cost differential is stable over time, with costs around 22% higher for patients that
receive this form of specialised care than for other patients allocated to the same HRGs.
x The overall financial impact is substantial, estimated to amount to £79m in 2013/14, and
activity is highly concentrated among hospitals, with the Gini>0.9, so payment arrangements
will have a material impact on these hospitals.
x This activity is spread across many HRGs, even more so following the greater differential of
cardiac sub-chapters in HRG4+ compared to HRG4. With a CR4=0.26, a top-up payment is
recommended.
NCBPS01R Radiotherapy
The recommendation is to apply a top-up in the short-term, but to consider sub-dividing HRGs.
x The cost differential is stable over time, with costs around 37% higher for patients that
receive this form of specialised care than for other patients allocated to the same HRGs.
x The overall financial impact is fairly substantial, estimated to amount to £20m in 2013/14,
and activity is extremely concentrated among hospitals, with the Gini>0.97, so payment
arrangements will have a material impact on these hospitals.
x This activity is concentrated within a handful HRGs, with a CR4=0.86. It is worth considering
whether the rules used to identify whether or not somebody has received this form of
specialised service are simply used to define a separate HRG. If this is done, the future tariff
for this new HRG will correctly compensate for the cost of caring for such patients.
NCBPS08S Neurosciences  Neurosurgery
The recommendation is to apply a top-up in the short-term but to review PSS identification rules.
x The cost differential is stable over time, with costs around 41% higher for patients that
receive this form of specialised care than for other patients allocated to the same HRGs.
x The overall financial impact is substantial, estimated to amount to £157m in 2013/14, and
activity is highly concentrated among hospitals, with the Gini=0.92, so payment
arrangements will have a material impact on these hospitals.
x This activity is spread across many HRGs, With a CR4>0.23, a top-up payment is
recommended  in the short-term.
x However, patients are identified as having received specialised care if they are treated by a
neurosurgeon. This is a poor way of identifying receipt of specialised care as it is not driven
by characteristics of patients but by treatment decisions made by the hospital. It is
recommended that these identification rules be reviewed.
NCBPS01Y Rare Cancers (Adult)
No change to payment arrangements are recommended for this PSS marker.
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x This is because, with the introduction of PSS-SMT, fewer patients are identified under the
revised identification rules  there were 30,019 in the analytical sample for Model 3 based
on the PSS rules but only 11,740 in the analysis based on PSS-SMT rules.
x Because only a subset of the former patients is now identified under PSS-SMT, the cost
differential has fallen from 17% to 5%. This differential does not warrant a top-up.
x The likelihood is that patients formerly allocated to this PSS marker are now being allocated
to newly defined PSS-SMT markers, some of which merit consideration for top-up
arrangements.
The new PSS-SMT markers for which top-up payments might be considered are shown in Table 22.
Table 22 PSS-SMT for consideration for top-up payments
PSS-SMT marker OLS % RE %
Sarcoma 58% 46%
Head and Neck cancer 10% 8%
Sarcoma 35% 21%
Upper GI Surgery 13% 10%
Specialised Urology - Penile cancer 38% 33%
Specialised Urology - Testicular cancer 34% 26%
Spinal cord injury 90% 86%
Paediatric Surgery - Trauma and Orthopaedics 23% 16%
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7. Conclusion
7.1 Brief summary of findings
The policy for the English NHS of concentrating specialised services in particular providers is
designed to improve outcomes for people with relatively rare conditions. But the payment system
needs to be aligned with this policy ambition, so that hospitals that provide specialised care are not
penalised financially for doing so. To address this we have assessed by how much costs are higher
for patients that receive specialised care than for other patients allocated to the same payment
group and, if so, how payment policy might be refined.
There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes specialised hospital care, but in England
attempts have been made to define specialised care according to the presence of specific diagnoses
and procedures in each patient's medical record. The definition sets have been revised over time,
the previous SSNDS having been replaced by the PSS. Out of 16,964,893 patients treated in English
hospitals in 2013/14, 10.5% were identified as having received specialised care under PSS rules and
11.8% under PSS-SMT rules.
We have applied the PSS sets of rules to determine whether the receipt of specialised care is
associated with higher costs relative to patients who have not received specialised care who are
assigned to the same set of HRGs. To do this, we have matched HES records to Reference Costs
reported by each NHS hospital.
x For 29 of the 69 PSS markers, we find cost differentials in excess of 10% when analysing
the cost of the core HRG to which patients are allocated (Model 3 RE).
x Only 24 of these 29 PSS markers have cost differentials in excess of 10% when the
updated PSS-SMT rules are applied.
x We find that 6 of the 35 new PSS-SMT markers have cost differentials in excess of 10%
(Model 3 RE).
x We observe fewer cost differentials when considering excess bed day costs (Model 5
RE), the differential being in excess of 10% for only 9 PSS markers.
The additional costs associated with the provision of specialised care to the entire patient
population are estimated to amount £572m in 2011/12, £628m in 2012/13 and £589m in 2013/14.
7.2 Implications for payment policy
The existence of large (>10%) cost differentials is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
changing either the HRG classification system or making top-up payments.
In our work we further considered materiality, in terms of both the financial impact and the number
of hospitals treating patients receiving specialised care. For those markers for which the estimated
cost differential is deemed to have a material impact, we suggest two ways in which payment policy
might be refined.
First, HRGs might be re-defined, so that they better separate higher cost patients that receive
specialised care from those that do not. This strategy is most easily adopted for those types of
specialised care where patients are concentrated in a limited number of HRGs, evaluated by
calculating the proportion of specialised activity concentrated among the four largest HRGs to which
these patients are assigned. PSS markers identified as candidates for HRG split include
Radiotherapy, Cardiac - PPCI and Structural Heart Disease Ears - Cochlear Implants; and Colorectal -
Transanal Endoscopic Microsurgery.
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In cases where patients are distributed across many HRGs, payments rather than HRGs might be
refined, with top-up payments made to reflect the additional costs associated with receipt of
specialised care. Top-up payments can be made to the core tariff, if cost differentials are evident
when analysing costs associated with the core HRG to which patients are allocated. They may also
be made to the excess bed day tariff, but cost differentials are less evident in the analysis of these
costs.
Top-up payments are currently made in England for four types of specialised care as defined by the
SSNDS (Monitor & NHS England, 2013), namely children's specialised care, neurosciences,
orthopaedics, and spinal surgery. These additional payments were informed by previous analyses of
2009/10 data (Daidone and Street, 2011a, Daidone and Street, 2011b, Daidone and Street, 2013).
Our analyses of more recent data suggest that there remain grounds for making top-up payments
for specialised care, as now defined using the PSS definitions.
We identify 20 of the original PSS markers as candidates for top-ups including several cardiac and
childrens services. The four PSS markers that might subject to a sub-division of their HRGs are
recommended for top-up payments in the interim before this sub-division is implemented. The
following new PSS-SMT markers implemented in the PSS Shadow Monitoring Tool are also
candidates for top-up arrangements: Sarcoma, Head and Neck cancer  Sarcoma; Upper GI Surgery;
Specialised Urology - Penile cancer; Specialised Urology - Testicular cancer; Spinal cord injury; and
Paediatric Surgery - Trauma and Orthopaedics.
7.3 Limitations
There is a large US literature analysing hospital costs that relies on charge data (eg see (Frakt, 2011)
for a review). Reference cost data are analogous to the charge data reported to the Healthcare Cost
Report Information System (HCRIS). Neither US charge data nor English RC data capture precisely
the costs of care for each individual patient (Dunham-Taylor and Pinczuk, 2006). The RC assigned to
each patient is based on the hospital in which they were treated, their method of admission (ie Point
of Delivery code: day case, elective, non-elective), the specialty in which they were treated (ie
service code e.g. general surgery), the HRG to which they are assigned, their excess bed days above
their HRG-specific trimpoint, any unbundled HRGs associated with their care, and if there are
multiple FCEs as part of their hospital spell.
The limitation of using RC data is that patients that share the same characteristics used for
assignment are assigned the same RC. As a limiting example, if all the elective patients in a
particular hospital, speciality, and HRG all had single FCE spells, and no excess bed days or
unbundled costs, then they would all have the same cost. For the analysis, this means that the RC
data exhibit less variation than occurs in reality. If some of this unobserved variation is related to
the receipt of specialised care, then the estimates of the cost differentials will be biased, most
probably in a downward direction. Recognising this limitation we also analysed variation in LoS. It is
reassuring that cost differentials are more likely to be observed than LoS differentials.
Patient-level information and costing services (PLICS) could alleviate the drawback of using RC, as
the system used in the construction of patient-level costs ought to take account of more specific
drivers of resource use than do the RC allocations. But PLICS will not resolve the problem entirely
because judgments still have to be made about how to apportion shared costs among individual
patients (Jackson, 2001). Also, on a practical level, PLICS will not be available in England for all
patients in the near future. PLICS reporting is currently not mandatory and for the latest year of
data we consider (2013/14) only 42% (68 providers) of all acute trusts were reporting patient level
costs; and participating hospitals were not representative of the overall population of hospitals.
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As PLICS data become available, payment arrangements can be progressively refined. Refinements
might involve construction of more resource homogenous HRGs and better calculation of the core
tariff and of excess bed day prices associated with each HRG. In the meantime, our analyses indicate
for which types of specialised services refinements are required to current HRG tariffs so that policy
ambitions to further the concentration of specialised services are not thwarted by an inadequate
payment system.
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